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Full Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework in order to analyse 
and understand the twin developments of successful microeconomic reform on the one hand 
and failed macroeconomic stabilisation attempts on the other hand in Hungary. The case study 
also attempts to explore the reasons why Hungarian policymakers were willing to initiate 
reforms in the micro sphere, but were reluctant to initiate major changes in public finances 
both before and after the regime change of 1989/90. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper applies a path-dependent approach by carefully 
analysing Hungary’s communist and postcommunist economic development. The study 
restricts itself to a positive analysis but normative statements can also be drawn accordingly.  
Findings – The study demonstrates that the recent deteriorating economic performance of 
Hungary is not a recent phenomenon. By providing a path-dependent explanation, it argues 
that both communist and postcommunist governments used the general budget as a buffer to 
compensate the losers of economic reforms, especially microeconomic restructuring. The 
gradualist success of the country – which dates back to at least 1968 – in the field of 
liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation was accompanied by a constant overspending in 
the general government. 
Practical implications – Hungary has been one of the worst-hit countries of the 2008/09 
financial crisis, not just in Central and Eastern Europe but in the whole world. The capacity 
and opportunity for strengthening international investors’ confidence is, however, not without 
doubts. The current deterioration is deeply rooted in failed past macroeconomic management. 
The dissolution of fiscal laxity and state paternalism in a broader context requires, therefore, 
an all-encompassing reform of the general government, which may trigger serious challenges 
to the political regime as well. 
Originality/value – The study aims to show that a relatively high ratio of redistribution, a 
high and persistent public deficit and an accelerated indebtedness are not recent phenomena in 
Hungary. In fact, these trends characterised the country well before the transformation of 
1989/90, and have continued in the postsocialist years, too. To explain such a phenomenon, 
the study argues that in the last couple of decades the hardening of the budget constraint of 
firms have come at the cost of maintaining the soft budget constraint of the state. 
Keywords Gradualism, Paternalism, Fiscal laxity, Budget constraint, Individual-specific 
uncertainty, Hungary 
Paper type Research paper 
 
Benczes 
Introduction 
Hungary has been long admired for its smooth and politically calm transformation process 
and its apparently well-designed reform strategy, the predecessors of which date back to the 
New Economic Mechanism (NEM) of 1968. The evident successes in the fields of 
marketisation, liberalisation and microeconomic restructuring, however, masked the inaction 
in other fields, especially in public finances. Apart from a few exceptional episodes, the 
general government has been left mostly untouched; thus, persistent delays and helplessness 
have characterised the last couple of decades in this respect. Understanding such a 
controversial performance is, however, not an easy task. This paper attempts to explore the 
reasons why Hungarian policymakers were willing to initiate reforms in the micro sphere, but 
were reluctant to initiate major changes in public finances both before and after the regime 
change of 1989/90. By providing a path-dependent explanation, the paper argues that both 
communist and post-communist governments used the general budget as a buffer to 
compensate losers of (micro)economic and political reforms. The ever-widening circle of net 
benefiters of welfare provisions paid from the general budget made it simply unrealistic to 
implement sizeable fiscal consolidation, putting the country onto a deteriorating path of 
economic development. 
The general budget has become the means for compensating people for losses, 
especially in the early times of microeconomic restructuring, which added strongly to 
transformational recession. While in other transition countries the euphoria at the time of the 
systemic change provided a so-called “window of opportunity” for politicians to implement 
severe reforms, no such opportunity emerged in Hungary. The established reform tradition of 
the country and the peaceful political change, with the active collaboration of the old and the 
new elites, made the systemic change a self-evident process. Accordingly, people simply 
refused to pay the inevitable costs of the change. The heavy burden of structural reform in the 
sphere of the micro economy was compensated by increased public provisions in the form of 
household transfer or public sector employment, thereby prolonging paternalism. By 1995, a 
near-crisis situation triggered a fiscal stabilisation in Hungary and soon after the recovery, 
politicians returned to fiscal indiscipline. Private consumption was further fuelled by public 
sources with the slogan of compensating people for sufferings endured during the austerity 
measures of 1995-1996.  
The hypothesis of the paper is thus that the success of marketisation and 
microeconomic restructuring, a process that started well before the systemic change itself, 
came at the price of a deteriorated performance of public finances and a lack of fiscal 
discipline in general. In more technical terms: the hardening of the budget constraint of 
market participants came at the cost of maintaining the soft budget constraint of the state. 
This hypothesis will be verified by the path dependency theory. As the theory can establish a 
structural and causal relationship between past and current events, it can grasp the 
evolutionary profile of Hungarian economic and political change. Furthermore, the applied 
methodology can shed light on why Hungary’s development path has differed so much from 
the experiences of other Central and East European (CEE) countries. 
Following the short introduction, Section 2 provides a short, stylised fact analysis of 
Hungary’s current deteriorated public finances. Section 3 turns to the explanation of the 
puzzle of persistent deficit and elaborates on the reform experience of Hungary between 1968 
and 1989, showing that market reform and fiscal profligacy emerged at the same time in the 
country. Section 4 concentrates on the transformation years and its aftermath to date, claiming 
that the path-dependent character of Hungarian development prevents the country from 
maintaining a sustainable track of fiscal policy. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
Fiscal laxity: stylised facts 
After twenty years of systemic change and five years as European Union members, Hungary 
has successfully developed into a fully-fledged market economy. The country has been one of 
the most successful in the process of marketisation, liberalisation and microeconomic 
restructuring. However, the performance in the field of public finances is far from convincing. 
Fiscal profligacy has become an integral feature of the country and the reform of the general 
government has suffered serious delays.  
 
Hungary, a country with 60 per cent of the average income of the EU (on PPP), maintains a 
relatively high level of redistribution. The ratio of public spending to GDP has always been at 
(or beyond) 50 per cent, a ratio that is characteristic of the welfare states of Scandinavian 
countries or France – countries with at least twice as high levels of development in terms of 
GDP (on PPP) than Hungary. More importantly, none of the former socialist countries – with 
an almost same level of development – has such a sizeable state sector (varying from 30 to 45 
per cent in GDP). Admittedly, there are substantial differences with regard to the size of states 
across Europe and the industrialised world.1 However, in Hungary, the high redistribution 
ratio coexisted with an extremely high and persistent budget deficit, which averaged 6 per 
cent in the last two decades. (Comparative data on EU countries are displayed in Figure 1.) 
The general government deficit has been mainly due to the overruns in the primary balance, 
especially in current spending. Public debt has also accumulated without bounds and reached 
the highest level among new member states, totalling 73 per cent of GDP by 2008 – the 
CEE10 average was 26.8 per cent in the same year (EC 2009). A large redistribution rate, 
together with a persistent deficit and an accelerated debt, have made the country extremely 
vulnerable to external shocks. At the same time, economic growth has declined significantly, 
too.2  
 
Figure 1. Public expenditures and revenues (general government) in EU27 
                                                 
1 Redistribution rates are of course not exogenous in the sense that they are strongly influenced by several 
political, historical and cultural patterns (see Aghion et al., 2004 for instance). Furthermore, there is no 
consensus at all in the literature on the optimal size of states. Both low and high redistribution ratios can deliver 
robust economic performance (see Sweden and Finland on the one hand and Ireland on the other hand). 
2 The economic growth rate reached only 1.1 and 0.8 per cent in 2007 and 2008, respectively, in Hungary, 
whereas CEE’s average was 7.1 and 2.4 per cent in the same years (EC, 2009).  
 
Source: own construction, data are taken from HNB (2008). 
Note: data as of 2006. The arrow (and the red dot) indicates the preferred position of 
Hungary by 2011. 
 
The real challenge to the country’s long-term fiscal sustainability is the unhealthy 
structure of the general government, especially on the expenditure side. Both the 
compensation of public sector employees and household transfers significantly exceed that of 
neighbouring countries and also most of the EU15 countries. The Hungarian public sector 
suffers from over-employment, although the labour market participation ratio is the lowest 
among OECD countries (56 per cent). One-fourth of the total employees work in a highly 
inefficient public sector. The disincentive structure of welfare provisions makes non-
participation in the labour market appealing. While spending on health care and education is 
slightly below that of the EU15 average, household transfers – such as family and child 
allowances, sick pay, disability pay or early retirement payments – are more generous than in 
most of the old member states. Economic functions conducted by the state often serve the 
interest of households, therefore price regulations on gas, housing or pharmaceuticals should 
be considered as welfare payments too.3 Table 1 depicts the distorted structure of the 
Hungarian general budget in a comparative perspective.  
 
Table 1. General government spending by economic decomposition, 2004-2008 
 EU15 CEE8 Hungary 
Compensation of public sector 
employees 
10.6 9.9 12.1 
Collective consumption 
expenditure 
8.1 9.0 9.9 
Social transfers in kind 12.7 10.0 12.2 
Social benefits other than 
social transfers in kind 
15.7 11.0 14.9 
Subsidies 1.2 1.1 1.4 
Interest payments 2.8 1.6 4.1 
Other current expenditures 2.4 2.1 2.5 
Gross fixed capital formation 2.4 3.9 3.7 
                                                 
3 Benedek et al. (2006) estimated the welfare part of economic functions of the state to 2 per cent of GDP.  
Source: EC (2009). 
Note: data as per cent of GDP. 
CEE8 includes the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia 
 
The general tendency to overruns in the fiscal balance and the unsustainable structure 
of the general government are, however, not exclusive characteristics of the post-communist 
years, as such disequilibria have well predated the systemic change of 1989/90. Advanced 
reforms, starting in 1968 within the field of micro economy, put an unexpectedly heavy 
burden on public finances. The road of marketisation, liberalisation and privatisation was 
paved by compromises and compensations buffered by the general budget. These tendencies 
have proved to be integral features of Hungary in the last fifty years.  
 
 
The New Economic Mechanism and its aftermath (1968-1989)  
The classical Stalinist regime prevailed for a relatively short period of time in Hungary. In the 
Stalinist regime, the maintenance of the political power of the communist party, along with 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, was underpinned by an almost complete nationalisation of 
property rights. State ownership and bureaucratic coordination – together with the massive 
use of political repression and terror – provided a solid ground for forced industrialisation. A 
rapid and extensive growth of the heavy industries was compelled at the cost of light industry 
and agriculture and especially individual welfare. The constant state of alertness for war and 
the extensive use of natural resources caused serious and constant shortages of consumer 
goods.4
By the mid-sixties, however, Hungary chose a different track. Instead of a blatantly 
repressive system, the communist party elite opted for the creation of an environment which 
endorsed political calm and material well-being. The historical lessons drawn from the 
Revolution of 1956 against the communist rulers forced political leaders to recognise the 
importance of meeting the material needs of the people (Kornai, 1990). Public spending was 
thereby redirected from physical investment to the material welfare of citizens, a shift that 
elicited the expression “goulash communism” as a namesake for the Hungarian system.  
From 1968 onwards, reforms of varying intensities were high on the agenda of 
Hungarian policy-makers. In rhetoric, the main objective of the first cycle of reforms (1968-
1973) was to increase the efficiency of the economy by introducing market incentives at 
company level. Decentralisation swept away mandatory output targets and input quotas. 
Economic decisions were delegated to the factory level. Managers were given more 
discretionary power. Indirect financial instruments were introduced in order to influence the 
behaviour of enterprises. Reform attempts culminated in an accelerated growth performance, 
which fuelled the improvement of individuals’ living standards.5  
Whatever merits the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) had, the ultimate goal of the 
Party elite was not economic efficiency per se. The decision to move towards marketisation 
was determined solely by political considerations. Party leaders of the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party engaged in stabilising their political power by providing additional economic 
growth and prosperity for families. By learning from past mistakes, a kind of “consumption-
oriented” approach to socialism evolved. Instead of forced savings and industrialisation, the 
emphasis was placed on people’s own relative prosperity. The NEM can be best interpreted 
therefore as a tacit agreement between the citizens and the Party: in exchange for a relatively 
                                                 
4 On the classical socialist regime, see especially Kornai (1992) and Kozminski (2008). 
5 Hare (1983) claimed accordingly that the NEM made Hungary unequivocally different from the rest of the 
Eastern bloc countries. 
high standard of living and relative freedom (hence the term “the happiest barrack”), citizens 
had to remain loyal to the Party and did not question the raison d’être of the socialist regime 
itself.6
The success was, however, relatively short-lived. External shock in the form of the 
first oil crisis of 1973 caused severe structural tensions in the country. Internal factors, 
however, played a possibly even more important role in the failure of the New Economic 
Mechanism. As the path dependency theory suggests, the “genetic programme”7 of the 
communist regime did not allow market reforms to push the Hungarian economy into the state 
of a new and stable, high-growth equilibrium. Bureaucratic intervention did not decline in 
practice. It was replaced by indirect bureaucratic management. The change occurred in form 
only, and left the intensity of economic dependence untouched.8  
In spite of the economic slowdown,9 political interest was adamant on preserving the 
relative well-being of citizens. With the objective of maintaining consumption-maximisation, 
Party elites turned to external financial sources. Such a change, however, culminated in 
foreign debt accumulation. Increased indebtedness and the oil crisis of 1979 triggered a 
second reform cycle in the country by 1982. The most significant elements of the reform steps 
were the following: informal activities (often called second economies) were legalised; small 
private firms (mostly in the service sector) were officially recognised; corporations could 
enter the financial market by issuing bonds; a two-tier banking system and a new, market-
conform tax system were introduced, etc.  
The official aim of the reform was to restore competitiveness. The real aim was, 
however, different and more practical. Party elites wanted to provide room for private 
initiatives on the market in order to maintain the relative well-being of families. The sixties 
saw a change in the incentive structure of large state enterprises and cooperatives in order to 
induce competition amongst them, thereby increasing national welfare. By the eighties, 
however, the further marketisation of state enterprises was not enough in itself to energise the 
economy. Instead, the private and the semiprivate sectors were allowed to spring into 
existence. By the mid-80s, more than 10,000 new small enterprises (“petty cooperatives” or 
“independent contract work associations”) existed, in contrast to fewer than 1000 state and 
cooperative enterprises.10  
In fact, market reforms from the early eighties onwards have been adopted out of 
necessity, with the explicit aim of avoiding further economic deterioration. The relative share 
of income from work declined dramatically, as opposed to other non-work related sources 
(see Table 2). Since marketisation significantly increased both aggregate and individual-
specific uncertainty, the state did not hesitate to embark on generous welfare programmes. 
Thereby, the short-sighted state elites became able to compensate the losers in the economic 
reforms. Generous welfare spending became an untouchable part of social rights later on, 
making any downsizing of such entitlements extremely difficult from a political point of 
view. Marketisation and economic restructuring were therefore implemented by applying 
measures which strengthened the winning coalition and minimised the number of losers at the 
same time. With market incentives and private property on the one hand and increased 
                                                 
6 By 1976, Hungary’s collective consumption equalled 20.3 per cent of GDP. Almost 60 per cent was dedicated 
to welfare provisions and one quarter to health care. 
7 The term “genetic programme” originates from Kornai (1992). 
8 Quasi-market incentives were assumed to induce competitiveness among firms. In practice, however, 
enterprises started to bargain with the different levels of bureaucracy for additional resources. Economic agents 
did not negotiate over the targets anymore, but over a complex net of economic regulations (such as credit, price, 
tax and subsidy) instead. 
9 Whilst Hungary grew at an average of 3.4 per cent between 1961 and 1970, it first slowed down to 2.6 per cent 
(1971-80), and then to -0.1 per cent (1981-88). (Kornai, 1992) 
10 See especially Bauer (1988). 
welfare spending on the other hand, pragmatist Party leaders provided a credible commitment 
to both market reform (favouring winners) and compensation schemes (placating losers).11
 
Table 2. Disaggregating personal income  
 Income 
from work 
Social 
benefits in 
cash 
Social 
benefits in 
kind 
Income 
from other 
sources 
1960 80.4 7.0 11.4 1.2 
1970 76.1 11.3 11.3 1.3 
1975 71.5 15.5 11.7 1.3 
1980 68.0 18.9 13.1 0.1 
1985 65.6 19.9 14.1 0.4 
1990 58.1 22.6 16.6 2.7 
Source: Kornai (1997). 
 
 
After the change 
The early years of transformation  
The first free election in May 1990 found Hungary with an almost complete price 
liberalisation (Csaba, 1995). The foundations for structural reforms in the micro economy 
were laid down a year before the elections by adopting the Company Act and the 
Transformation Act. In turn, spontaneous privatisation evolved. Accordingly, there was no 
need to apply a big bang approach in Hungary as chosen by several other CEE countries, 
especially Poland and Russia. Big-bangers wanted to prevent their countries from reversal 
(both in political and economic terms) and argued that with speedy reforms the elite of the old 
regime could be demolished.12 In Hungary, with its long reform tradition, however, political 
change managed to evolve without mass demonstrations and strikes in a politically calm and 
peaceful environment. The so-called “round-table” negotiations, including the representatives 
of both the communist and the main opposition parties, consensually defined the framework 
and the sequence of the political shift to democracy.13  
At the very start of the new regime, the freely elected political forces tried to 
implement a series of painful reforms with the explicit aim of hardening the budget constraint 
of firms and individuals in 1990 and 1991. The Hungarian bankruptcy law liquidated 
insolvent capacities mercilessly, causing an immediate and drastic fall in economic activity.14 
Hardening the budget constraint of enterprises came at a high price, however. Transformation 
recession totalled at 18 per cent of the GDP by 1993, and, in turn, Hungary experienced the 
most dramatic fall in employment in the region. Adopting the 1989 level as 100 per cent, 
employment declined first to 87 per cent by 1991 and then further down to 72 per cent by 
1994. The numbers for the same period were 90 and 85.5 in Poland, and 93.5 and 90.5 in the 
                                                 
11 By 1981, Hungary’s public expenditure (measured to GDP) significantly exceeded other socialist countries’ 
data: 63.2 versus 53.2 in Poland, 53.1 in Czechoslovakia, 47.1 in the Soviet Union, and 43.5 in Romania 
(Kornai, 1992).  
12 On the big-bang versus gradualism debate, see Balczerowitz (1995) and Gros and Steinherr (1995) on the one 
hand and Aghion and Blanchard (1994) and Dewatripont and Roland (1995) on the other. 
13 Furthermore, members of the previous socialist system were allowed to participate in the first free elections 
and became members of the new establishment. 
14 The liquidation of low-quality companies triggered the need for large bank consolidations too (Király, 1994). 
Czech Republic. Unemployment reached double-digit numbers in the first half of the nineties; 
it peaked at 12 in Hungary (Basu et al., 2000).15
Under socialism, guaranteed employment meant a solid safety net for families. The 
appearance of the second economy in the eighties also provided some extra income for 
citizens. After the change, the loss of jobs in both the first and the second economy in turn 
endangered the living standard of individuals and also the relative political calm. In principle, 
the transformation recession should have triggered a dramatic erosion in living standards and 
private consumption, which was not the case, however. Private consumption declined 
proportionally much less than other macroeconomic variables, thereby giving a special 
character to the Hungarian transformation – see Table 3.  
 
Table 3. GDP and its components, 1989-1994 
 GDP Final consumption Gross capital  formation 
  Total of which: total 
household 
consumption 
Total of which: fixed 
capital 
formation 
1989 100 100 100 100 100 
1990 96.5 97.3 96.4 95.5 93 
1991 84.8 92.3 90.8 75.3 83.3 
1992 82.3 92.7 90.8 60.1 81.2 
1993 81.7 97.7 92.4 79.5 82.7 
1994 84.2 95.4 92.4 95.1 93 
Source: own calculations based on CSO (2007). 
Note: The closing date is 1994, because one year later Hungary adopted an austerity 
package.  
 
In order to understand such a paradoxical change, one needs to confront these numbers 
within the context of Hungary’s past. Relative political calm was maintained after 1968 by 
allowing individuals to earn more on the market and to benefit from the increased welfare 
spending of the state. As path dependency theory claims, no current decisions can be made 
without taking into account the constraints of past actions and institutions.16 The taxi and 
lorry drivers’ blockade against the price increase of petrol just 4 months after the free 
elections made it clear to the political incumbents that people would not tolerate the decline in 
their personal (but not aggregate) wealth status. It was clear that reform in the micro sphere 
could go further only if the government compensated citizens. To put it differently: the new 
democratic leaders recognised that the price of microeconomic restructuring was accordingly 
the preservation of the relative well-being of citizens. Household transfers were expanded to 
an extent which could significantly counterbalance the negative consequences of a fall in 
output. The general budget was burdened by generous social entitlements in the form of 
unemployment benefit, family allowance, sick leave, early retirement schemes, etc., thereby 
preserving the pre-existing welfare state of the socialist past.17 As the communists earlier 
purchased the loyalty of citizens by providing an unsustainably high standard of living by 
                                                 
15 The unemployment rate was even higher in Poland; it peaked at 16 per cent. Unemployment in the Czech 
Republic reached only a very low level of 3.5 per cent in the early years of transformation. Nevertheless, 
following the 1997 Czech crisis, it climbed to 8 per cent. 
16 See for instance David (2001). 
17 While the economically active population declined from 5.22 million in 1989 to 4.54 million by 1994, the total 
number of pensioners and other beneficiaries increased from 2.42 million to 2.95 million. The monthly average 
number of families receiving family allowance increased from 1.37 million to 1.50 million in the same period of 
time (CSO, 2007). 
maximising current consumption at the expense of the future, the government at the time of 
transformation followed a similar attitude. By providing relatively generous social protection, 
individual-specific uncertainty was reduced substantially in times of a severe transformational 
fall. In turn, individuals considered increased welfare payments as rightful compensations for 
the loss of their jobs, making it rather hard to cut back on them later on. That is, there was a 
strong tendency for a high level of redistribution and overspending at a time when one of the 
major challenges of the country was to deconstruct the old and inefficient state structure and 
to promote a shift towards getting incentives right that are compatible with market economies.  
From such a perspective, it is reasonable to claim that the gradualist character of the 
Hungarian transformation was not the result of a conscious decision of the freely elected 
government, but a historically determined path dependent outcome of a two-decade long 
reform process which culminated in the political change of 1989. Applying the term 
“gradualist” with regard to Hungary is therefore misleading. Originally, the theorists of 
gradual reforms favoured a sequenced and embedded reform process and argued against the 
total suspension of past capacities, since it would have triggered an unnecessary fall in supply, 
ending up in impoverishing and frustrating citizens. The early years of the Hungarian 
transformation, however, were burdened with ambiguity and a lack of coherence in policy 
decisions.18  
 
 
Stabilisation first and a return to paternalism later 
The artificially high level of aggregate demand caused serious imbalances in both the internal 
and external positions of Hungary. With the re-emergence of a twin-deficit, in 1994-95 a 
financial crisis threatened the country. The inaction of the Hungarian authorities on the one 
hand and the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-95 on the other made international financial 
investors reluctant to finance Hungary. In order to avert a crisis, a stabilisation package was 
adopted by 1995. The fundamental goal of the surprise package was to remedy the 
disequilibria in both the foreign and the internal balances, thereby stopping the dangerous 
spiral of indebtedness, and consequently regaining the trust of foreign investors. While 
preserving the political calm was an eminent objective of both socialist and post-socialist 
governments between 1968 and 1995, the austerity package reneged on it and made the 
restoration of economic stability the only valid goal.19
The package aimed at enforcing short-term stabilisation and long-term sustainability at 
the same time. Besides the strict measures of demand contraction, it also tried to break down 
the pre-existing paternalist welfare state. It restored the competitiveness of the economy by 
reducing real wages in the economy by 12 per cent and by significantly accelerating the 
privatisation process. The consumption-oriented character of Hungary’s reform cycles could 
be replaced by an investment-oriented one only because of two factors: the real threat of a 
financial crisis and the availability of a “technopol”, the finance minister.20  
However, the change in orientation did not last too long. As soon as the direct threat of 
an economic collapse diminished, Hungarian politics regained its pre-crisis character. By 
1999, the growth rate of private consumption exceeded once again the increase of overall 
economic activity, which was further deepened by the world-wide economic slowdown in 
2001 and the rebirth of a political business cycle in 2002 (Figure 2.). Election economics 
                                                 
18 For an elaboration, see Csaba (1995). 
19 The austerity measures were worked out in full discretion without the involvement of the parliamentary parties 
or social partners. This was the only time from 1968 onwards when stabilisation was initiated without any 
compromise.  
20 The term “technopol” was originally coined by Williamson (1994). It refers to a person who behaves as if s/he 
was a social welfare planner. 
along with the old reflexes of compensating losers of the austerity package have re-
emerged.21 The consequent deterioration of fiscal balance again put Hungary on an 
unsustainable path of development. Apart from a short period of necessarily exerted fiscal 
discipline, Hungary continued its previous regime of consumption-maximisation. It meant the 
regression to an expansionist state paternalism, financed by increased public liabilities. 
Politicians were yet again unwilling to embark on the radical and necessary macroeconomic 
policy changes, especially in the field of public finances (Antal et al., 2005). The budget 
constraint of the state weakened dramatically and the general budget itself again became a 
buffer in order to compensate losers. 
 
Figure 2. Change in economic output and private consumption, 1995-2008 
 
Source: data are taken from the EC (2006 and 2009). 
Note: red line: 3 per cent reference value of the EU. 
 
As the main element of fiscal profligacy was the compensation of losers of 
macroeconomic stabilisation and microeconomic reforms, the two main sources of fiscal 
overruns in the early years of the new millennium were increased public sector wages22 and 
increased household transfers. On average, employees in the public sector received a fifty per 
cent hike in total between 2001 and 2003. The share of compensation of public sector 
employees to total outlays climbed to 25 per cent by 2003 from the initial 20 per cent in 2000 
(OECD, 2004). A far as household transfers are concerned, family-related benefits 
proliferated substantially both in scope and size (i.e., family allowance, maternity allowance, 
child-bearing benefit and childcare benefit, child raising support and childcare allowance). 
Generous housing subsidies can also be considered as welfare provisions.23 For pensioners, 
the so-called 13th month premium was introduced by 2002 in a country where 90 per cent of 
the employees have been eligible to retire years earlier than the official retirement age.  
                                                 
21 In 2002, the new governing coalition explicitly announced the initiation of a “systemic change in welfare 
politics” which meant a radical shift away from fiscal sustainability to increased welfare spending in order to 
redistribute the fruits of the stabilisation measures of 1995-1997 to as many people as possible.  
22 The statutory minimum wage also increased dramatically (in real terms it equalled 65 per cent). Kertesi and 
Köllő (2004) found that the wage rise triggered a significant fall in employment opportunities, especially in the 
small- and medium-sized sector. They estimated a 3.5 per cent decrease of employment in companies employing 
5-20 persons. The most seriously hit sectors were the labour-intensive ones. 
23 Between 2001 and 2004 mortgage lending was actively supported by housing subsidy schemes of alternating 
governments, providing a negative real interest rate for borrowers. Furthermore, the monthly mortgage payment 
became tax-deductible. 
Hungary has also been the country with the highest share of disability benefit 
recipients, and the amount of social benefit paid to this group has increased drastically over 
the past decade. The number of disability benefit recipients increased from the starting level 
of 250,000 in the early nineties to 450,000 in 2005 which is more than 11 per cent of 
employees.24 Sick pay, on the other hand, has been used by many as an extension of 
unemployment benefit after the termination of the employment contract. In the mid-2000s, 
unemployment insurance benefit was paid to around 100,000-130,000 people, supplemented 
by an incredibly high number of 80,000 people receiving sick pay. The generous welfare 
system, along with an outstandingly high tax wedge on employment, provides serious 
disincentives to work: only (a bit less than) four million out of the total seven million active 
people are registered employees in Hungary. The real challenge to welfare benefits is that 
such fiscal expenditures are always considered as entitlements. Once people become entitled 
to receive them, they show strong political resistance to any change in the system – a 
phenomenon that was well-known in the socialist past, too. The continuation between the 
communist and the post-communist era is demonstrated by the time series on household 
income and consumption between 1960 and 2005 (see Table 4). The data reveal that a 
dramatic gap emerged between real wages on the one hand and real income (wage plus 
welfare payments and subsides) and consumption on the other hand – both before 1989 and 
after.25
 
Table 4. Real wage, real income and consumption, 1960-2005 
 Real wage per 
wage-earner 
Real income per 
capita 
Consumption per 
capita 
1960 100 100 100 
1965 109 123 115 
1970 129 159 150 
1975 152 199 185 
1980 158 216 208 
1985 151 236 220 
1990 142 245 238 
1995 118 215 205 
2000 127 234 236 
2005 176 296 319 
Source: CSO (2007). 
Note: Numbers are index, 1960=100. 
 
Political myopia also strengthened an extremely sloppy planning of both public 
expenditures and revenues. The finance ministry overestimated revenues and the potential for 
economic growth and underestimated expenditures in the annual budget in every single year 
between 2001 and 2006 (OECD, 2006).26 Hungary – due to the lack of action and ill-
conceived policy choices – has found itself in the crossfire of swelling criticism: international 
rating agencies have downgraded the country, and even the European Committee has blamed 
Hungary several times, thereby making the loss of credibility of the Hungarian economic 
                                                 
24 An additional 350,000 people receive disability benefit, although they have already passed the retirement age. 
In total, 9 per cent of the population within the 20 to 64 age group is entitled to a disability benefit in Hungary, 
which is in strong contrast with that of other CEE countries or the neighbouring Austria for instance, where the 
ratio is only around 6 per cent (OECD, 2004:76). 
25 A more elaborated scrutiny of the expenditure side of the Hungarian general budget between 1995 and 2006 is 
provided by Benczes (2008). 
26 The gap between revenues and expenditures reached 9.2 per cent (!) of GDP by 2006. 
policy (and policy makers) fully overt. The period between 2001 and 2006 can be best 
characterised as an irresponsible and permanent election campaign where both the incumbents 
and the opposition tried to outperform their rivals by promising more spending from the 
budget without keeping an eye on the financing constraint of their populist measures. Despite 
the fact that since autumn 2006 the government has initiated some changes and fiscal 
discipline has been strengthened somewhat, essential reform measures are still waiting to be 
adopted. As Csaba (2009:95) accurately stated: “the stagnation of reforms and the deepening 
of mutual distrust among and across all players of the political scene have created a 
paralysis.”  
The crisis of 2008-2009 left Hungary in an extremely weak structural and financial 
position. The country embarked on an irresponsible deficit-financing policy throughout the 
heydays of the 2000s. Due to short-sighted policy activity, the country accumulated debt, lost 
competitiveness and severely reduced the potential of economic growth at a time when other 
countries in the CEE region experienced just the opposite tendencies. The pro-cyclical 
character of Hungarian fiscal policy did not leave ample room for policy makers to tackle the 
crisis by fuelling aggregate demand. Hungary was amongst the very first countries, in fact, to 
be severely hit by the crisis. Once again, external forces pushed the country into changing its 
lax fiscal regime into a more restrictive one in order to revert the perverse effects of the crisis. 
The adopted measures have only concentrated, however, on short-term adjustment needs and 
lacked the long-term perspective of a comprehensive restructuring of the general budget. Past 
experience has shown that missing such an opportunity can cost too much in this small and 
extremely open, but at the same time strongly paternalistic, country. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Hungary is one of the worst-hit countries of the current financial crisis in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The deteriorating economic performance of the country is, however, not a recent 
phenomenon, as the paper has documented. A high ratio of redistribution, a high and 
persistent deficit and accelerated indebtedness are not new phenomena in Hungary, but 
elements of both the communist and the post-communist history of the country.  
By providing a path-dependent explanation, the paper argued that starting with the 
marketisation attempts in the socialist era, that is, well before the systemic change of 1989-90, 
politicians used the general budget as a buffer to compensate losers of economic and political 
reforms. This attitude did not change with alternating governments after the first free elections 
either, and it has been re-emerging from time to time in the last twenty years.  
In fact, individual-specific uncertainty and the heavy burden of structural reform of the 
(micro) economy have been compensated by increased public provisions in the form of 
increased employment in the public sector and increased welfare transfers. It seems that the 
success of marketisation and microeconomic restructuring, which once made Hungary the 
most advanced transition economy in the region, came at the price of deteriorated fiscal 
discipline. Political forces managed to harden the budget constraint of enterprises on the one 
hand and to maintain a relatively large supportive winning coalition of restructuring on the 
other, only at the cost of softening the budget constraint of the state. In turn, paternalism has 
survived systemic change and it now endangers the healthy and sustainable development of 
the country – a country which had a remarkable reform history but which has dramatically 
devalued its future prospects. 
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